Society's decision."
5 Vancouver lawyer Harry Rankin described the processes that left-wing applicants were put through as a "private inquisition," a "Star Chamber tribunal," a "witch hunt," and a "most undemocratic procedure . . . simply political intimidation" designed to dissuade law students from "any real thinking about change." 6 I have piled on too, accusing the Benchers of acting on a "whim" and the courts of substituting politics for legal reasoning and failing "miserably to live up to their role as guarantors of liberty." 7 Such assessments bite but gloss far too quickly over the complicating contexts of mid-century administrative law and of then-prevalent notions of "character" and the legal profession. An indication of the gap that separates their notions of "character" from ours is found in the words of the oaths required of new lawyers. Barristers were called upon to swear "so help me God," their commitment to adhere to a distinct professional role:
You are called to the degree of barrister to protect and defend the rights and interests of such persons as may employ you. You shall conduct all causes faithfully and to the best of your ability.
You shall neglect no man's interest, nor seek to destroy any man's property.
You shall not refuse causes of complaint reasonably founded, nor shall you promote suits upon frivolous pretences. You shall not pervert the law to favour or prejudice any man, but in all things shall conduct yourself truly and with integrity. In fine, the King's interests and your fellow-subjects you shall uphold and maintain according to the constitution and the laws of this Province. 8 The Barristers' Oath (which was identical to the Solicitors' Oath) was in the following form:
I, A.B. do sincerely promise and swear . . . that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George VI as lawful Sovereign of Great Britain . . . and of this Dominion of Canada, and that I will defend him to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies or attempts whatsoever which shall be made against his person, crown and dignity, and that I will to my utmost endeavour to disclose and make known to His Majesty, his heirs or successors, all treasons or traitorous conspiracies and attempts which I shall know to be against him or any of These words, the solicitors' status as officers of the court, and their understandings of the roles of the legal profession steered the outcome. By contrast, today's "Barristers' and Solicitors' Oath" in British
Columbia expunges all reference to loyalty to Crown, country, or Constitution along with obligations to "neglect no man's interest," to respect property, and to obstruct treason:
Do you sincerely promise and swear (or affirm) that you will diligently, faithfully and to the best of your ability execute the offices of Barrister and Solicitor; that you will not promote suits upon frivolous pretences; that you will not pervert the law to favour or prejudice anyone; but in all things conduct yourself truly and with integrity; and that you will uphold the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of all persons according to the laws of Canada and of the Province of British Columbia?
Contemporary understandings are found in the written reasons of the Benchers, in a ruling of Mr. Justice
Coady, and in the separate reasons of five justices of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
The Benchers' Ruling
Martin's communism was beyond doubt. He had run for election to the provincial legislature as a Labour Progressive Party (communist) candidate and was president of the University of British Columbia's student Communist Forum. 10 There was "nothing covert . Although Martin admitted to being communist, he initially refused to answer questions about his views on the ground that the Benchers did not "have the authority to inquire into mine, nor anyone else's politics."
The Benchers took a simple view of their statutory obligations (a matter within the field that lawyers know as "administrative law"): the discretion to admit was entirely theirs. Their decision did not need to be based on evidence in any ordinary sense of the word, and their only duty was to "exercise their discretion honestly in the public interest and upon considerations of good sense." 14 Within those bounds, they said, they were immune from oversight. A bolder assertion of discretionary power and a narrower scope for external constraint can hardly be imagined: they believed themselves to be fully empowered as gatekeepers to the profession, and their decisions were irreversible as long as they did not act dishonestly or in deliberate bad faith. In remarkably circular reasoning, his claim that he could take the necessary oaths in good faith served to prove his dishonesty:
When Mr. Martin states that he can conscientiously take such an oath, in view of his subscription to and general acceptance of the Marxist Manifesto, the Benchers find it difficult to believe in his sincerity or intellectual honesty.
Their opinion is that in spite of his statements to the contrary he would be taking the oaths unscrupulously. 22 And dishonesty in this regard negated all testimony as to his character: 16 Benchers' ruling, at 109. 17 Benchers' ruling, at 110; also see "'Red' Law Student." 18 Benchers' ruling, at 109. 19 Benchers' ruling, at 107. 20 Benchers' ruling, at 109. 21 Benchers' ruling, at 110. Anyone exposed to Marxian theory in graduate school --or anyone exposed to legal education, for that matter --might be somewhat more sympathetic to Martin on the matter of words meaning other than they seem. 22 Benchers' ruling, at 110.
An applicant who takes such an oath unscrupulously is in their opinion not a person of probity or of good repute, regardless of the general opinion as to his character held by persons who know vaguely of his beliefs. Such persons cannot be expected to be aware of the incompatibility of those beliefs with the requirements of the oaths to be taken by a barrister and solicitor in the Province of British Columbia. 29 On the first argument, BCSC, para. 7, "s. 2 of the Oaths of Allegiance Act clearly indicates that the taking of the oath may be required as a statutory condition to the acceptance of the office." The reasoning on the second argument was in two parts. First, the Discipline Committee was engaged only in the face of a complaint, and there was no "complaint" against Martin. Second, status as an apprenticing lawyer did not make him a "member of the society" under the Legal Profession Act. Consequently, Martin remained an applicant for admission who bore the burden of persuading the Benchers of his fitness, not a member being subjected to discipline (at paras. 10-11). 30 BCSC, at para. 16.
Benchers of the "good repute" needed for admission to the professions. 31 "Good repute" turns out to be both conceptually distinct from "good moral character" and a higher standard.
Who knew?
Much follows. Any right to become a lawyer, inchoate or otherwise, evaporates in the face of an explicit obligation imposed by statute on the Benchers to exercise their discretion in satisfying themselves as to this distinct requirement.
They are not in such inquiry as they may conduct, bound by strict rules of evidence, nor do they require to have before them strict proof of every matter or thing which they are entitled to consider. . . . They are not deprived of their discretionary power by the enrolment of the applicant nor by the acceptance of the evidence of good moral character submitted at that time. . . . The statute here, rather than imposing a duty on, grants a power to the Law Society, which in turn is exercised by the Benchers. Notwithstanding the enrolment of a student-at-law or articled clerk, the discretionary power to call or admit is, it seems to me, in no way thereby curtailed or abrogated. It still remains in the absolute discretion of the Benchers and so long as that discretion is exercised honestly, fairly and reasonably, and from no indirect or improper motives and on no irrelevant or alien grounds, it is not open to review. . . . 
Martin's Day in the Court of Appeal
Martin's appeal was heard by five justices, each of whom wrote an opinion. The outcome is clear (all five ruled against Martin), but multiple judgments serve to obscure the legal principles relied upon. Three legal issues needed to be decided.
1. What was the proper role of the Court of Appeal in reviewing the Benchers' decision? 2. Were the Benchers more properly characterized as an "administrative" body or as a "judicial" body whose decisions affected "rights"? 3. Had the Benchers conducted themselves properly in reaching the conclusion that Martin was unfit to become a barrister and solicitor?
Background understandings of communism mattered to all this, of course. The Benchers' decision effectively created a class of individuals ineligible to become barristers or solicitors as they had come "to the conclusion that the Marxist philosophy of law and government, in its essence, is so inimical in theory and practice to our constitutional system and free society, that a person professing them is eo 35 Chief Justice Sloan and Mr. Justice Sidney Smith explicitly addressed the first of the legal questions. Each concluded that the matter was most properly treated as an appeal from the decision of an "administrative" body rather than as a retrial ("trial de novo"). This conclusion severely limited the scope of matters that the Court of Appeal would consider:
The amendment simply states that there shall be an appeal to this Court, and nothing more. Had it been the intention of the Legislature that we should embark on new proceedings, nothing would have been easier than to say so. The appeal is from a decision of the Benchers, and in my opinion the Benchers are an administrative body. That being so, the usual and well-known principles governing appeals from such bodies apply here; and so we can only interfere with their finding if their procedure was wrong, or if they acted in bad faith or against all reason or the public interest, or if they formed their opinion upon grounds never brought to appellant's notice. Ill repute completely disqualifies; but good repute is only the beginning of the matter. The truth is that there is nothing in the whole of the Legal Professions Act that entitles any person to be admitted to the Society (and in this I include call to the Bar). There are various sections stating that the Benchers may admit an applicant who complies with such and such conditions; but no section says that they must admit anyone. The whole is left to their discretion. And we must take the Act and the amendment as we find them. We cannot add to or detract from them. . . .
[C]ompliance imposes no obligations on the Benchers. More pointedly, they were not required to base their decision on a rational interpretation of evidence. They could, they said, form their judgment on the basis of their own hunches about "matters of 55 A. agreed with the comments of his colleagues, at least in broad outline. He emphasized that Martin had been heard personally and was represented by counsel before the Benchers and that they had issued "extended written reasons" for their decision. 68 The crux of the matter was of far greater importance than the minutiae of administrative law:
I dismiss the appeal on the broad ground (although narrower grounds may be found) that a Marxist Communist cannot be a loyal Canadian citizen; at best his loyalty must be divided between Canada and the Communist leadership outside Canada which is engaged ideologically through him (whether he knows it or not) and others of like indoctrination in promoting disruptively in Canada and other countries what Lenin called "the class struggle of the proletariat" for the world revolution.
I would dismiss the appeal. Intriguingly, much of the judgment is given over to fierce criticism of American thought.
Thinking USA cases unduly soft on communism, O'Halloran J. A. directly repudiated the "neutral and detached view of Communism" of "the majority of the United States Supreme Court, as it was constituted between 1937-1947." 73 The judges of that day were, he said, "detached" and "quixotic," misled by an anti-authoritarian philosophy that supported "fictions and formulae difficult to reconcile with the realities of modern life." Judgments produced by "slim majorities" of a foreign court, produced in "disturbed periods," should be cautiously approached. White's demarcation of the major American thinkers of the late nineteenth century, including John Dewey, Charles Beard, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Harvey Robinson, and Thorstein Veblen, as antiformalists marked the first work of intellectual history dedicated to a broad theorization of this period. He was the first to treat these individual critiques of historical analysis, philosophical speculation, and economic discourse as part of a shared intellectual project. What united these thinkers, according to White, was the growing sense that theirs was a period of transition, that the social revolution prompted by the corporate form had fundamentally altered the social and cultural framework of modern society. Consequently, all of these thinkers were preoccupied with delegitimating the standards of the past and projecting an outline for the future. The "revolt against formalism," then, entailed a rejection of "intellectual and moral rigidity" and an attachment to "the moving and the vital in social life."
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Each of these disparate thinkers rejected "the 'formalism' of abstract and deductive approaches to the study of philosophy, economics, law, politics, and history." 78 Holmes famously observed that "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." 79 It has been said that the larger group "realized that the life of the mind has not been logic but experience. As a result, they appreciated that thinking inevitably involves evaluating, willing, and acting to shape a culture's perception of itself rather than attempting to frame ideas according to presumably abstract and unchanging logical rules." 80 In short, they decoupled thought and policy making from claims of authority based on cultural inheritance, tradition, or
God's will. Theirs was radical stuff, questioning all other faiths save their own profoundly deep faith in rationality, evidence, and reason. [I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought --not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. . . . I would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make the country what it is. . . . I had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.
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If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas --that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death. . . . Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 
O'Halloran J. A. and the Professionalism of Canadian Barristers or Solicitors
His lordship also elaborated on another aspect of British-Canadian distinctiveness, the role for the legal profession. "The Law," Mr. Justice O'Halloran declared, "is a profession; it is not a business or trade."
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As such, it stands outside market relations:
[T]he law student's training is not manual training, but is training of the mind, not only in law, but if he wishes to be something more than a mere legal mechanic, he must study logic, history, in particular constitutional history, political science and economics, a certain amount of philosophy and acquire a reasonable familiarity with English literature, and know something at least of the literature of other countries. The job of the lawyer is basically to advise people upon all manner of things arising out of the complexities of life and the frailties of human nature. As such he cannot fail in time to acquire an influence upon others, impossible to reduce to purely material terms. It is not too much to say that the training and experience a lawyer undergoes fits him for leadership to a greater or less degree. Obviously such men should not be partial to political philosophies and movements that conflict with the interests of their own country.
By reason of these things, all countries throughout the ages have given the lawyer a correspondingly high place in society --particularly so in the case of the lawyer who pleads in the higher Courts. The object of law training is to attract young men of high character, and to train them in a manner that they will be trustworthy, honourable and competent in the performance of their legal duties, and will use such influence as they may have to maintain and improve but not to destroy our Canadian constitutional democracy. They are to be the defenders and not the destroyers of liberty. They are expected to be sufficiently well-informed and experienced to distinguish between liberty and licence.
. . . If every person had the right to practice law upon passing the University law examinations, there would be no protection for the public. It is the duty of the Benchers to protect the public by refusing admission to the practice of law, not only the type of person who will prey upon the public for his own selfish ends, but also the type of person who professes a political philosophy alien to our free society, and who in a time of "cold war" is little else than a fifth columnist (designedly or not) to assist an unfriendly country to destroy the rights and privileges a free people have established in Canada. 95 Three aspects stand out as particularly jarring to twenty-first-century sensibilities. First, O'Halloran J. A. thought it "obvious" that no lawyer should hold viewpoints "that conflict with the interests of their own country." Specific articles of faith were required:
Those who accept common-law theory and practice confess to a belief in inherent rights of the individual diametrically opposed to the Hegelian and Marxist concepts of the state. . . . One dividing point appears clearly on the subject of inherent individual rights as adopted by Locke (who wrote the political philosophy of the Constitutional Revolution of 1688) and later with some variations, by Jefferson, when contrasted with the denial of these inherent rights by Hegel, Marx, Lenin and others upon whose political philosophy any type of totalitarian state is based. Hegel is the source of modern Fascist and Communist perversions. 96 Lawyers, in short, were bound tightly to the existing British-Canadian constitutional structure, and communism was not a legitimate "political opinion" in the proper meaning of the term. 97 Holmes's notion of the Constitution as "an experiment" would have seemed as abhorrent as Martin's Marxism.
Second, O'Halloran J. A. thought that the Benchers' duty to "protect the public" was not limited --as we now generally think --to ensuring baseline competencies and screening out amoral individuals who might "prey upon" unsuspecting clients for their "own selfish ends." High standards of personal integrity and ethics were required, but the leadership roles of lawyers demanded more: conformity to the requirements of "common-law theory and practice." The office of barrister or solicitor involved a positive and expansive duty to state and community not confined to narrow conceptions of role. Lawyers were not to be mere mouthpieces or guns for hire to do their clients' will. Protecting the public meant more than protecting clients.
And third, O'Halloran J. A. emphasized the moral role of lawyers in the community. His observation that their "influence over others" was "impossible to reduce to purely material terms" points to the importance of moral influence, broadly understood. Lawyers brought moral compass to bear in matters of business and in "the complexities of life and the frailties of human nature" in all their dimensions. A full-service paternalism that acknowledges clients as personal, familial, moral, social, economic, and spiritual beings puts lawyers' character into play in a way that simply cannot be imagined if the professional role is narrowed to serving instrumental or economic objectives in isolation.
When professionalism is so conceived, the conclusion that beliefs "inimical to his country" are "repugnant to the ancient and honourable profession of law" 98 is inevitable. And communist exclusion followed.
Historian as Quizmaster
How, then, are we to judge?
The The university was a place of tolerance, and leftist students were able to pursue three years of legal studies without obstruction. At the University of British Columbia law faculty, they were able and willing to return as good as they received in political argument. Although some "professors were openly hostile" to Harry Rankin's politics, "many could remain objective. Canadian law teachers of the day, and it seems likely that most of the law-teaching profession had little taste for political repression.
Manitoba's lawyers declined to follow British Columbia's lead when a well-known young communist war veteran, Roland Penner (later provincial attorney general and dean of law at the University of Manitoba law faculty), decided to pursue a legal career. 100 British Columbia's law society continued to police the bounds of political belief but did so ineffectually. Immediately following Martin's exclusion, four law students were selected for a political inquisition, and each gained admission.
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Rankin viewed the exercise as one in simple "political intimidation, the Law Society letting a whole generation of law students know that it was unacceptable to do any real thinking about change." 102 Sherwood
Lett, who chaired the law society's credentials committee, required him to swear an affidavit in the following terms:
I, Harry Rankin, do solemnly swear that I am not a communist or a member of any association holding communist views, that if called to the Bar I can take the Barristers' Oath without reservations of any kind and that I have no intention of following any communist association in the future.
That I do not and will not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of democratic government by force or violence or other constitutional means.
Accepting that the Benchers and judges exercised choice in acting as they did, I want to suggest nonetheless that attention to context makes moral judgment more difficult than might at first seem. By way of conclusion, I wish to suggest, first, that the courts took the proper approach to reviewing the Benchers' decision; second, that, despite their rhetoric, there was less emotional irrationality to their anticommunism than seems; and, third, that, odd though it may appear, the expansive view of lawyers as especially charged with a mission in service of king and constitution was the proper understanding of their time.
Each of the appellate judges emphasized their agreement with the Benchers' view that communists were eo ipso barred from admission to the legal profession. This view, and their lordships' many pages of impassioned, almost hysterical prose, distract from the formal reasons for decision (the ratio decidendi) of the case. The distinction is important. It is possible both that their views on the essential nature of communism were wrong and that the legal decision to uphold Martin's exclusion was correct.
The legal outcome of the case before the courts was simply that the courts should not seek to second-guess the judgment of the Benchers because the legislature had granted them a power to decide.
The legislative scheme had to be respected. As there was no evidence of mala fides or improper motivation, and as Martin had been accorded an opportunity to explain himself, there was no reason to interfere. For a generation of lawyers who have different attitudes toward administrative decision making and who are conditioned by the Charter to imagine that courts can always "trump" the legislature, this approach can be hard to appreciate. Current legal fashion does not imagine a bright-line distinction between "privileges" and "rights" and does not categorize tribunals as "administrative" or "judicial."
Twenty-first-century legal culture may take a more favourable attitude toward substituting the views of judges for the decisions of other bodies. Contemporary legal authority, however, supported the approach of the courts in Martin. 104 The narrow reasons for decision were certainly correct under the prevailing legal doctrine of the time. 105 Seemingly eccentric understandings of the role of lawyers also appear less strange in context. Our generation is disinclined to view lawyers as anything other than commercial service providers who complete business transactions, do solicitors' work, and deal with the courts on behalf of their clients.
Consequently, we view the ends of regulation as nothing more mystical than protecting clients from incompetent or unscrupulous individuals. Lawyers' ethical codes, like those of pharmacists and used car salespersons, 106 regulate a market for services. Massive transformations during the sixty years separating us from the Martin case have profoundly changed the character of the legal professions. 107 Viewed through our demystified, democratized lenses, earlier understandings of lawyers' roles appear puffed up, inflated, arrogant, implausible, and ridiculous. It matters little to us if a lawyer cannot honestly swear fidelity to the queen --or that he or she might be disinclined to subvert "treasonous conspiracies." 108 However, the view that lawyers, through their mundane work, play a key role in social cohesion and constitutional governance, that their influence and importance cannot be reduced to "purely material terms," has an ancient lineage. 109 Indeed, the modern structures of Canadian legal professionalism, including self-regulation of the profession, codes of ethics, and patterns of legal education, were all derived from just such a professional ideology. 110 The views of Martin's antagonists were consistent in this regard with the highest aspirations for the legal professions as they were then understood. If those individuals are to be treated as objects of ridicule on this count, it can only be because we judge their time ridiculous.
What, then, are we to make of the legal establishment's vehement anti-communism? Both the vehemence and the "anti" are beyond doubt. Their passion seems irrational. Gordon Martin would engage in treason; it did not matter that his behaviour was exemplary or that he affirmed his good faith intentions to swear allegiance to His Majesty. Gordon Martin would seek to subvert "property"; it was irrelevant that he testified otherwise. Gordon Martin would act as a fifth columnist in the Russian cause; neither his denials nor the absolute absence of evidence mattered. The court offered its own interpretation of Marxist doctrine as authoritative, not Martin's. The fact that his explanation differed from the court's could only be because Martin was lying or dangerously deluded. The notion that, as a matter of definition, a communist could not be a "good Canadian" verges on tautology. To elevate this to a common-law rule seems ridiculous. All seven reasons for decision in the Martin cases are clear that "evidence" in any legal sense was neither required nor desired. Considering the case from the point of view of communists who aspire to become lawyers, the rationale and outcome are outrageous. The thought that a war veteran, the son of a prominent communist member of the Winnipeg city council, might be denied admission to the legal profession despite his personal and familial records of service to community and country seems repulsive. 111 The full horrors of Stalin and Mao were not fully appreciated, and many idealists had reason to imagine that Marxism might be liberating.
It does not, however, take enormous leaps of imagination to see things from the opposite viewpoint. 112 However unjust the outcome may have been, Gordon Martin was emphatically not the victim of a witch hunt, picked out for discriminatory treatment as a result of a search for "reds under the bed," on account of rumour and innuendo, loose associations, or involvement in unions. The Benchers had an authentic "red" before them. Moreover, communism then seemed frightening, just as newer Communism and all that pertains to that philosophy I think is now recognized as having a connotation equivalent to Fifth Column. It is common knowledge that Governments on this continent, public and private organizations, more particularly among Trades and Labour Unions, alive to the danger of Communist infiltration and influence are now alert to the menace, and are actively moving towards its elimination. 
